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Louisiana Civil Procedure
Howard W. L'Enfant*
I. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
In Miller v. American Dredging Co.,' the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that state law, not federal law, governed whether a Jones Act and
maritime law case should be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds.
The plaintiff, a Mississippi resident, employed by the defendant, a
Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in New
Jersey, had been injured on a vessel on the Delaware River and had
filed a Jones Act and general maritime claim against the defendant in
state court in Orleans Parish where the defendant had a registered agent
for service of process. The trial court sustained the exception of forum
non conveniens subject to the right of the plaintiff to pursue his claim
in a competent court in Pennsylvania. The court of appeals affirmed.'
In considering this issue, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that
the doctrine of forum non conveniens has been a part of admiralty law
since 18011 and has been applied by federal courts generally since 1947. 4
But in Louisiana the application of the doctrine is controlled exclusively
by Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 123' which expressly states
that the provisions of the article shall not apply to claims brought
pursuant to the Jones Act or federal maritime law. 6 Thus Louisiana law
would not allow this case to be dismissed for forum non conveniens.
The lower courts had determined, however, that this issue must be
decided according to federal law because the defense of forum non
Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Henry Plauche Dart Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 595 So. 2d 615 (La. 1992), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3844 (U.S. May
29, 1992) (No. 91-1950).
2. Miller v. American Dredging Co., 580 So. 2d 1091 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991),
rev'd, 595 So. 2d 615 (La. 1992).
3. Miller, 595 So. 2d at 616, citing Alexander M. Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum
Non Conveniens as Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 Cornell
L.Q. 12 (1949).
4. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S. Ct. 839 (1947).
5. Fox v. Board of Supervisors, 576 So. 2d 978 (La. 1991) held that Louisiana
courts could only dismiss cases for forum non conveniens as provided in Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure article 123.
6. La. Code Civ. P. art. 123(C).
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conveniens is a fundamental feature of federal maritime law. 7 The su-
preme court rejected the position that federal law preempted state law
for several reasons. First, the supreme court drew support from a United
States Supreme Court decision' which held that a state could apply its
own forum non conveniens law to a claim brought under the Federal
Employers Liability Act (FELA) because the Jones Act is based upon
the FELA9 and thus the same result should be reached in a Jones Act
case. Additional support was found in federal cases which held that
federal forum non conveniens applied in diversity cases.' 0 The court in
Miller reasoned that if forum non conveniens is not considered part of
a state's substantive law for purposes of the Erie" doctrine then federal
forum non conveniens should not be considered part of federal sub-
stantive law for purposes of the "reverse Erie doctrine.' ' 2 Moreover,
the court reasoned that the interests in self-regulation, administrative
independence and self-management which persuaded federal courts to
apply federal forum non conveniens in diversity cases are equally ap-
plicable to support Louisiana's application of its own forum non con-
veniens law.
The decision by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Miller is at odds
with the decision by the Fifth Circuit in Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam
Choo3 where the court held that federal forum non conveniens pre-
empted state law in a maritime action. In reaching this result, the federal
court reasoned that state law jurisdiction over maritime cases is derivative
under the "savings to suitors" clause,14 that forum non conveniens is
a characteristic feature of maritime law and a uniform application of
the doctrine is needed because of the transnational and international
nature of maritime commerce; and that the application of state law
7. Ikospentakis v. Thalassic S.S. Agency, 915 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1990); Exxon Corp.
v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 486 U.S.
140, 108 S. Ct. 1684 (1988).
8. Missouri ex rel. Southern R.R. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 71 S. Ct. 1 (1950).
9. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 63 S. Ct. 246 (1942).
10. In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987),
vacated on other grounds and remanded, 490 U.S. 1032, 109 S. Ct. 1928 (1988), reinstated
in pertinent part, 883 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1989).
11. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938), held that federal
courts must apply state substantive law in the absence of controlling federal substantive
law.
12. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 106 S. Ct. 2485 (1986), held
that the "savings to suitors" clause allows state courts to entertain in personam maritime
causes of action, but in such actions the extent to which state law may be used to remedy
maritime injuries is governed by federal maritime standards-the so-called "reverse-Erie"
doctrine.
13. 817 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 486 U.S. 140, 108 S. Ct.
1684 (1988).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1333.
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interferes with the exercise of federal power over international relations
and foreign affairs. This case arose out of the death of the plaintiff's
husband in Singapore. In the original action, the federal court had
dismissed the federal claims under the Jones Act, Death on the High
Seas Act, and general maritime law on the merits and had dismissed
claims under Texas law and Singapore law on forum non conveniens.'"
After the plaintiff had filed claims under Texas and Singapore law in
Texas court, the defendants unsuccessfully tried to remove the case to
federal court'6 and then brought an action in federal court to enjoin
litigation in state court. After reaching the conclusion that the issue of
forum non conveniens was controlled by federal law, the district court
granted the injunction, and the court of appeals affirmed. The United
States Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether federal forum
non conveniens preempted state law in maritime cases. Instead it reversed
on the very narrow grounds that an injunction under the relitigation
exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283 was not justified because the issue of
whether a Texas court in Houston would be an appropriate forum to
try the Singapore law claim which had not been litigated and decided
by the federal court in the original action. That court had only decided
that a federal court in Houston would not be an appropriate forum.
Therefore, until the United States Supreme Court chooses to resolve
the issue of whether federal forum non conveniens preempts state law
in maritime cases, we have the opposing positions of the Louisiana
Supreme Court and the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In considering the question of whether federal law should control in
this area, it might be helpful to consider the nature and application of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens in light of the factors relied on
by the Fifth Circuit in Chick Kam Choo: the need for uniformity and
the need to avoid interference with foreign affairs. The United States
Supreme Court, in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,'7 stated that in deciding
the issue of forum non conveniens a court is to weigh the private
interests of the litigants, including ease of access to proof, evidence,
and all of the practical problems that make the trial of the case easy,
expeditious, and inexpensive and is also to consider the public factors
such as court congestion, local interest in the matter, and whether the
law of the forum would be applied. Unless the balance is strongly in
favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed. Because such a balance must be struck in light of the particular
facts of each case, it is hard to see how uniformity will be achieved.
15. Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 699 F.2d 693 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 826, 104 S. Ct. 98 (1983).
16. Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1985).
17. 330 U.S. 501, 67 S. Ct. 839 (1947).
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Even if a state court and a federal court in the same state applied the
same factors, the weighing and balancing of these factors could lead to
different results. The fact that a federal court might conclude that the
case should be tried in Singapore does not necessarily mean that a state
court weighing those same factors would reach the same result. If the
application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens can not achieve
uniformity of results, does it matter that lack of uniformity between
state and federal courts in the same state may also result from state
law rejection of the forum non conveniens doctrine?
On the question of interference with foreign affairs, it is difficult
to see how a decision by a state court to assert jurisdiction over a
wrongful death claim that occurred in a foreign nation in any way
interferes with the sovereignty of that country.' 8 Choice of law principles
accord proper weight to the interest of that country in having its law
determine the rights and obligations of the parties. The exercise of
jurisdiction by a state court simply relieves the courts of that country
of the burden of adjudicating the dispute. Defendants who engage in
maritime commerce are concerned about being subjected to litigation in
a forum quite distant from the occurrence and the evidence. These
concerns are protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which allows a state to assert jurisdiction over a defendant
only if the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum and the
assertion of jurisdiction will not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice. 9 Among the factors included in this analysis
are: the interest of the forum, the law to be applied, the burden on
the defendant, and the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining
the most efficient resolution of controversies. 20 For example, in Asahi
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California,2' the Supreme Court
stated, "The unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself
in a foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing the
reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over
national borders." ' 22 The Court held that assertion of jurisdiction over
the defendant, a Japanese company, was constitutionally unfair because
the burden was severe and the interests of the forum and the plaintiff
was slight. Thus, the defendant is assured that the forum which ad-
18. See David W. Robertson & Paula K. Speck, Access to State Courts in Trans-
national Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions, 68 Tex.
L. Rev. 937 (1990) for a critique of the Court's reasoning in Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam
Choo.
19. See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County,
480 U.S. 102, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 114, 107 S. Ct. at 1033 (1987).
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judicates the controversy will be a fair forum even if it is not the most
convenient forum.
When all of these factors are considered, it would seem that a state
should be free to decide how it will expend its judicial resources and
whether it wants to exert jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or whether it
will decline to exercise that jurisdiction in favor of another forum it
considers more convenient. Either way, it is a choice the state should
be free to make. Defendants have the protection of the Constitution
and can choose whether to establish contacts by setting up an office,
hiring a registered agent, or by doing business in a forum like Louisiana
which has a very limited forum non conveniens doctrine. The interests
of foreign countries would seem to be adequately protected by choice
of law principles, and it has yet to be persuasively demonstrated how
Louisiana's assertion of jurisdiction would interfere with any federal
interest.
II. JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER
In Sampson v. Wendy's Management, Inc.,21 the plaintiff filed an
action in state district court alleging that the defendant had fired her
because she had filed a claim for worker's compensation benefits and
that this retaliatory discharge violated Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1361.
The defendant filed a peremptory exception of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, arguing that the Office of Worker's Compensation had
exclusive jurisdiction over the claim. The district court overruled the
exception, and the court of appeal granted a supervisory writ. In re-
versing the district court, the court of appeal concluded that section
1361, which prohibits a retaliatory discharge, is part of the Worker's
Compensation Act because even though it is not in the benefits section,
it is in the section dealing with the administration of worker's com-
pensation claims. In interpreting the Act, the court found no evidence
of legislative intent to treat a claim for penalties for retaliatory discharge
differently from a claim for benefits nor could it find any compelling
reason to treat such a claim differently.2 4 Therefore, the court held that
a claim for retaliatory discharge was a claim under the Worker's Com-
pensation Act and controlled by Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1310.3
23. 580 So. 2d 430 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 593 So. 2d 336 (La. 1992).
24. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied, in part, on scholarly articles which
argued that an action for retaliatory discharge was part of the Worker's Compensation
Act and should be included in worker's compensation insurance coverage. See Wex S.
Malone and H. Alston Johnson, III, Workers' Compensation Law and Practice § 362.5,
in 14 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d ed. 1980); H. Alston Johnson, Workers' Com-
pensation, Developments in the Law, 1985-1986-Part I1, 47 La. L. Rev. 521 (1987).
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which granted jurisdiction over all claims filed pursuant to the Worker's
Compensation Act to the Office of Worker's Compensation.
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs and reversed.2s In reach-
ing this decision, the court classified a claim for a retaliatory discharge
as a delictual employment action, a statutory exception to employment
at will, rather than a worker's compensation matter. The fact that the
statute creating the cause of action for a retaliatory discharge was in
the chapter on worker's compensation was not persuasive to the court.
In addition, the court interpreted Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1310.3
as giving hearing officers exclusive jurisdiction only over claims for
compensation or benefits. The court stated that the Act provides for
agency determination of benefits and penalties directly associated with
the employee's work-related injury and receipt of worker's compensation
benefits. 26 The court drew further support for its position from the fact
that a worker is protected from a retaliatory discharge whenever he
seeks benefits under the Act or under the law of any state or the United
States. In light of this fact, the court concluded that it would be illogical
for a worker who had not asserted a claim for benefits under the
Louisiana Act to file a claim for retaliatory discharge with the Office
of Worker's Compensation Administration, which was created to ad-
minister the provisions of the Louisiana Worker's Compensation Act.
Furthermore, the court asserted that the independent nature of a
claim for retaliatory discharge is evident in cases where an employer
refuses to hire or discharges an employee who had filed a compensation
claim against a previous employer. For these reasons, the court held
that an action for a retaliatory discharge was not a worker's compen-
sation matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Office of Worker's
Compensation Administration.
Sampson presents a close question of statutory interpretation. At
the time this case was decided by the court of appeal, Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:1310.3 provided: "A. (1) All claims for any compensation
or benefits under the Worker's Compensation Act shall be commenced
with the filing of a notice of injury with the director.''27 Section A
further provided, "All matters pertaining to such injuries shall be pre-
sented to the director .... "28 This language, "cohpensation or bene-
fits," "notice of injury," and "all matters pertaining to such injuries,"
seems to support the supreme court's interpretation that this provision
was not intended to vest exclusive jurisdiction over a claim for a re-
taliatory discharge in the Office of Worker's Compensation because,
25. Sampson v. Wendy's Management, Inc., 593 So. 2d 336 (La. 1992).
26. La. R.S. 23:1291-1361 (1985).
27. La. R.S. 23:1310.3 (1989).
28. Id.
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arguably, such an action is not a claim for compensation or benefits.
But while the case was pending in the supreme court, section 1310.3
was amended to provide: "A. A claim for benefits, the controversion
of entitlements to benefits, or other relief under the Worker's Com-
pensation Act shall be initiated by the filing of the appropriate form
with the office of worker's compensation administration. " 29 Moreover,
section E provides: "[The hearing officer shall be vested with original,
exclusive jurisdiction over all claims or disputes arising out of this
Chapter." 0 The language of the amended section is much broader; use
of the phrases, "or other relief" and "or disputes arising out of this
Chapter," arguably supports the conclusion that a claim for retaliatory
discharge falls within its provisions. But the supreme court did not
consider this amendment or whether, as a procedural statute, it could
be applied retroactively.
In addition, legislative history reveals that among the factors which
prompted the transfer of jurisdiction of worker's compensation matters
from district courts to the Office of Worker's Compensation was a
desire to provide faster and more economical processing of claims which
would lower the costs of worker's compensation and to provide more
uniformity in decisions by placing the decisions in the hands of nine
hearing officers instead of 260 district judges."' Is it in keeping with
these aims to give the agency exclusive jurisdiction over actions for a
retaliatory discharge? It could be argued that if giving the agency ex-
clusive jurisdiction over claims for benefits would provide for uniform,
efficient, economical disposition of these claims, then the same results
could be achieved with respect to claims for penalties for a retaliatory
discharge. From the employer's point of view, if use of the agency
procedure would reduce the cost of processing claims for benefits, it
could also reduce the cost of claims for retaliatory discharge. And the
uniformity and expertise developed by the agency would be as valuable
in resolving retaliatory discharge disputes as in deciding claims for
compensation. Finally, it could be argued that the action for a retaliatory
discharge is an integral part of the Act because it offers protection for
a worker who files a claim for benefits and makes this protection
available whether the claim for benefits was filed under the Louisiana
statute or under laws of another state or the United States. This furthers
the purpose of the Act to provide effective compensation for injured
workers by discouraging an employer from taking retaliatory action.
29. La. R.S. 23:1310.3 (Supp. 1992).
30. Id.
31. Minutes of June 10, 1988, hearing of the House Committee on Labor and
Industrial Relations as stated in Moore v. Roemer, 560 So. 2d 927, 938 (La. App. Ist
Cir. 1990).
1993]
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III. PRESCRIPTION
In Maquar v. Transit Management of Southeast Louisiana, Inc.,32
a case consolidated with Sampson for oral argument and rendered on
the same day, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the filing of a
claim for penalties for a retaliatory discharge with the Office of the
Worker's Compensation Administration, which had no jurisdiction to
hear the claim, interrupted prescription. In reaching this result, the court
assumed that the plaintiff had joined his claim for retaliatory discharge
with his claim for worker's compensation and that the employer received
notice of the claim within one year from the date of discharge. The
court found that this case did not fit squarely under Louisiana Civil
Code article 3462 which provides, "If action is commenced in an im-
proper court ... prescription is interrupted only as to a defendant
served by process within the prescriptive period,"33 because, at the time
these claims were filed, the Office of Worker's Compensation Admin-
istration was not a court. Nevertheless, the purpose of the prescriptive
articles had been fulfilled because the defendant had received notice
within the one year prescriptive period for delictual actions. The court
also noted that there was little guidance in the cases until its decision
in the Sampson case as to the nature of the claim for retaliatory
discharge, and the plaintiff had not been unreasonable or tardy in
pursuing his claim.
Since the court seemed to base its decision on general considerations
of fairness, how would the court rule if a plaintiff were to file a timely
claim with the Office of Worker's Compensation Administration for
retaliatory discharge after the decision in Sampson that such an action
is not within the jurisdiction of that agency? The defendant would have
received notice within the year, but now there is a clear statement in
case law, and the plaintiff's action in filing the claim with the agency
would not be considered reasonable. It is suggested that, in such a case,
the court should apply Louisiana Civil Code article 3462 and find that
the agency should be considered an incompetent court, that is a court
which lacks subject matter jurisdiction,3 4 and that prescription is inter-
rupted by notice to the defendant within the year. If timely notice
protects a plaintiff who mistakenly files in a court which lacks subject
matter jurisdiction, it should also protect an employee who mistakenly
files a claim for a retaliatory discharge with the Office of Worker's
Compensation Administration.
32. 593 So. 2d 365 (La. 1992).
33. La. Civ. Code art. 3462.
34. La. Code Civ. P. art. 5251(4).
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In Parker v. Southern American Insurance Co.," the plaintiff filed
a wrongful death action against the liability insurer of her husband's
employer, Sheriff Cappel. The death occurred on May 20, 1984, and
the dismissal of plaintiff's earlier compensation suit against Sheriff Cap-
pel had been affirmed by the Louisiana Supreme Court 6 on February
12, 1987. This action had been filed on February 24, 1987, and the
trial court and court of appeal sustained the defendant's exception of
prescription." The supreme court held that prescription had been in-
terrupted by the earlier suit because both the compensation suit and the
tort suit were based on liability of the sheriff for the deceased's death;
the insurance company had notice through notice to its insured; the
parties were closely related; and after the dismissal of the earlier suit
on lack of compensation coverage, both the employer and his liability
insurer were aware of the potential liability. In addition, the court stated
that the sheriff's office and its insurer were solidary obligors and that
interruption of prescription against the sheriff by the earlier compen-
sation action also interrupted prescription as to the insurance company.
The supreme court's decision that a timely action for compensation
benefits interrupts prescription on a tort claim against the same employer
and its liability insurer, in effect, overrules contrary decisions by courts
of appeal even though not mentioned by the court. For example, in
Aleem v. Aabco Contractors, Inc.," the fourth circuit court of appeal
held that a timely filed compensation action did not interrupt prescription
on a subsequently filed tort action against the same defendant. And in
Chenier v. Vanguard Party Sales, Inc.,19 the third circuit court of appeal
held that a timely filed tort action did not interrupt prescription on a
later asserted compensation claim.
IV. VENUE
In Chambers v. LeBlanc,40 the plaintiff filed a legal malpractice
action in Livingston Parish, his domicile, against an attorney who was
domiciled in Iberville Parish and practiced in Ascension Parish, for
failure to timely file a suit in East Baton Rouge Parish. The trial court
overruled the defendant's exception of improper venue, and the defen-
dant applied to the court of appeal for supervisory writs. The supreme
35. 590 So. 2d 55 (La. 1991).
36. Parker v. Cappel, 500 So. 2d 771 (La. 1987). The supreme court held that the
Worker's Compensation Act, which excluded coverage for all sheriff's deputies except
Orleans Parish sheriff's deputies, was constitutional.
37. Parker v. Southern Am. Ins. Co., 578 So. 2d 1021 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
granted, 581 So. 2d 668, rev'd, 590 So. 2d 55 (1991).
38. 422 So. 2d 1293 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
39. 430 So. 2d 367 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
40. 598 So. 2d 337 (La. 1992).
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court expedited review by granting the writ. In doing so the court stated
that even though the issue of improper venue was an appealable matter,
because it could not, as a practical matter, be corrected on appeal after
trial, an appellate court need not resolve the issue through the appellate
process. Thus, by its action, the supreme court seemed to suggest that,
in the future, review of a trial court's decision overruling an exception
of improper venue should be through the more expeditious application
for supervisory writs than through the slower appellate process.
On the merits, the supreme court had to resolve the question of
where damages were sustained for purposes of applying Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure article 74, which places proper venue in the parish
where the wrongful conduct occurred or where the damages were sus-
tained. The court held that when damage is sustained in the parish
where the wrongful conduct occurred, that parish is the parish of proper
venue under Article 74, even if the plaintiff is in the parish of his
domicile at the time the wrongful conduct occurred or even if the damage
progresses in the parish of the plaintiff's domicile. 41 The court concluded
that the wrongful. conduct occurred either in Ascension Parish or in
East Baton Rouge Parish, but clearly not in Livingston Parish. Although
not expressly stated, the court, by implication, must also have concluded
that Livingston Parish was also not a parish where damages were sus-
tained. Thus Livingston Parish was not a parish of proper venue under
Article 74, and the exception of improper venue was sustained. The
court remanded the case for transfer to a parish of proper venue. In
support of its decision, the court cited Belser v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co.,42 in which the plaintiff had filed a medical malpractice
action in St. Helena Parish, his domicile, alleging that his vision had
become impaired as a result of by-pass surgery performed in East Baton
Rouge Parish and that, as a result, he lost his medical practice in St.
Helena Parish. In deciding that St. Helena was not a parish of proper
venue, the court held that if any damages were sustained in the parish
where the wrongful conduct occurred, that parish and no other was the
parish where the damages were sustained for purposes of venue under
Article 74. The court reasoned that the article must be strictly construed
to minimize forum shopping in actions for the recovery of damages for
offenses and quasi-offenses. This view now seems to have been accepted
by the supreme court in Chambers.
It is interesting to compare the approach taken by Louisiana courts
on the question of proper venue in tort actions with that of the federal
courts. The Louisiana position is that Article 74 is to be strictly inter-
preted so that there is only one parish of proper venue. In other words,
41. Id.
42. 509 So. 2d 12 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
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in a case like Belser, if the plaintiff sustained some injury in East Baton
Rouge Parish but most of the consequences of the surgery occurred in
St. Helena Parish, venue would only be proper in East Baton Rouge
Parish. This result, the court reasoned, is necessary to prevent a plaintiff
who is seeking damages for pain and suffering from always being able
to sue in the parish of his domicile by alleging that is where the pain
and suffering occurred. But such an approach, while it does discourage
forum shopping, also seems to be somewhat at odds with the general
purpose of venue, which is to provide a convenient place for trial in
terms of access to evidence. In a case like Belser, applying general
principles of convenience would make both East Baton Rouge Parish-
where the defendant's conduct occurred and some injuries were sus-
tained-and St. Helena Parish-where the injuries increased and the loss
of professional activity occurred-parishes of proper venue. In federal
courts, the venue statute43 provides that venue is proper in a judicial
district in which a substantial part of the events occurred. Arguably,
this would be either the judicial district where East Baton Rouge Parish
is located, or the judicial district in which St. Helena Parish is located
(assuming they were located in different judicial districts). The problem
of forum shopping is addressed by giving the court discretion to transfer
the action to any district where it might have been brought for the
convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice."
Louisiana has a similar provision in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 123, but it is not effective to solve the court's concern with
forum shopping because it prohibits transfer if the action has been
brought in the parish of the plaintiff's domicile. It might be a better
solution to amend this article to delete that provision. This would enable
Louisiana courts to give the venue articles a broader interpretation in
keeping with the purpose of securing a convenient place for trial and
would also meet the problems of forum shopping by ordering a transfer
under Article 123.
V. EXCEPTIONS
In Labove v. Theriot,41 the Louisiana Supreme Court had to resolve
issues concerning the proper use of the peremptory exception of res
judicata and the proper methods to amend a final judgment. The prob-
lems in this case began when the plaintiff submitted a judgment dis-
missing the action against all parties with prejudice. This was a mistake
because the plaintiff did not intend to dismiss all of the defendants.
To correct this error, the plaintiff submitted a second judgment, which
43. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a)(2) and (b)(2) (Supp. 1992).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1970).
45. 597 So. 2d 1007 (La. 1992).
19931
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
amended the first judgment, to revive the action against one of the
previously dismissed parties. This second judgment was submitted and
signed without notice or hearing about five weeks after the first judgment
had been signed. Almost two years later, on the morning of trial, the
defendant filed an exception of res judicata, which was sustained by
the trial judge, on the grounds that the amended judgment was invalid
because it had been rendered without a contradictory hearing. The court
of appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion.4
The plaintiff first argued that the amended judgment was valid
because the defendant had consented to the change. The supreme court
noted that an amendment which changes the substance of a judgment
can be made by a motion for a new trial, by appeal, or by consent of
the parties47 but found that in this case there was no evidence in the
record to support the contention that the defendant had agreed to the
amendment of the judgment which reinstated the claim against him.
The plaintiff also argued that the exception of res judicata was not
the proper way to attack the amended judgment, and that the defendant
should have attacked the judgment by a motion for a new trial, by
appeal, or by an action to annul. The court stated that the exception
of res judicata was based on the first judgment which had dismissed
the action against the defendant with prejudice. When this exception
was raised, the burden of going forward with evidence shifted to the
plaintiff to attack the judgment. When the plaintiff attempted to meet
this burden by arguing that the first judgment was no longer valid
because it had been amended, this put at issue the validity of the amended
judgment. The court further noted that the absolute nullity of a judgment
may be raised at any time and in any proceeding where the validity of
such a judgment is asserted 48 and concluded that the issue of the nullity
of the amended judgment had been properly raised in this case.
The plaintiff's last argument was that the defendant was barred by
the doctrine of estoppel from raising the exception because the defendant
had participated in discovery and other preliminary matters and had
delayed urging the exception until the morning of the trial, which was
almost two years after the signing of the amended judgment. The court
refused to consider the defense of estoppel on the grounds that it is
contrary to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 928, which provides
that the exception of res judicata may be filed at any time prior to
submission of the case, and that the doctrine of estoppel would render
this article meaningless.
46. Labove v. Theriot, 587 So. 2d 221 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
47. See Villaume v. Villaume, 363 So. 2d 448 (La. 1978); Hebert v. Hebert, 351 So.
2d 1199 (La. 1977).
48. See Charia v. Mungoven, 550 So. 2d 939 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
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While it may seem harsh to allow the defendant to wait until the
day of trial to assert the defense of res judicata, that is what is clearly
allowed by the scheme of the Code. The Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure provides that some defenses are waived if not asserted promptly,
namely, the declinatory and dilatory exceptions, but that other defenses
raised by the peremptory exception may be raised at any time prior to
the submission of the case. 49 Moreover, the Code provides that the
appellate court may consider the peremptory exception filed for the first
time on appeal if pleaded prior to the submission of the case for a
decision and if supporting proof appears in the record.5 0 In light of the
wide latitude given to the defendant as to the timing of raising the
peremptory exception, the court was clearly correct in rejecting the
plaintiff's argument of waiver or estoppel. Moreover, any harshness of
this decision is mitigated by the fact that the plaintiff was aware of
the first judgment and must also be held to be aware of provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure which allow the defendant to raise the
defense of res judicata at any time before the submission of the case
either in the trial court or in the appellate court. Based on this knowl-
edge, plaintiff should have anticipated that this defense would be raised.
VI. CUMULATION OF ACTIONS
In Jones v. Arnold," the plaintiff filed an action to recover for
injuries sustained in an automobile accident and then filed a separate
action against another defendant for aggravation of injuries caused by
a second accident. The trial court first cumulated the actions but then
entered a judgment sustaining the exception of improper cumulation.
The supreme court granted writs and, in a per curiam opinion, held
that even though the cumulation was improper because there was no
community of interest between the parties joined, the trial judge had
abused his discretion in ordering dismissal of one of the actions instead
of ordering separate trials because extensive discovery had been com-
pleted during the thirty month delay before the trial court had ruled
on the exception. The court set aside the judgment and ordered the
trial court to grant separate trials of the improperly cumulated actions.
Even though this is a per curiam decision, it is worthy of comment
for several reasons. The first is the court's conclusion that the actions
were improperly cumulated because of a lack of community of interest
between the parties joined. Does the court mean to say that when a
plaintiff sues two defendants for injuries sustained and aggravated in
two separate accidents, then cumulation is improper? If so, this is
49. La. Code Civ. P. art. 928.
50. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2163.
51. 589 So. 2d I (La. 1991).
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unfortunate. The question of cumulation should be left to the discretion
of the trial judge who should consider the facts of each case in light
of the principles of judicial efficiency, convenience, and fairness which
govern whether cumulation is proper. The decision of the trial judge
should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. In a case like this, it could
be argued that cumulation serves the interest of judicial efficiency because
the issues of the extent of plaintiff's injuries and causation would be
presented in each case if they were tried separately. These factors need
to be weighed against the risk of confusing the jury and possible prejudice
to the defendants. Such determinations can only be made on a case by
case basis, and it is hoped that the court did not intend to change
that.52
It may also be important to note that Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 463, which requires that there be a community of
interest between the parties joined, does not seem to give as much
guidance to the courts as does Federal Rule 20.11 Federal Rule 20 allows
joinder when the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence
or series of transactions or occurrences, and when there is a common
question of law or fact. The rule focuses on the practical concerns of
efficiency and fairness which should govern questions of cumulation.
Moreover, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1562 allows con-
solidation of separate suits if there is a common issue of law or fact.
In addition, the court seemed to order separate trials in this case
only because of the unfairness caused by the long delay and completed
discovery. On this point, it might have been better for the court to
state that in cases of improper cumulation for lack of a community of
interest, the ordinary remedy should be to order separate trials and that
only in extraordinary cases should the court dismiss one of the actions
and force the plaintiff to refile it. In a case like this where the plaintiff
could have brought separate actions but instead tried to cumulate the
actions, if the court decided the joinder was not proper, then logic
would suggest that the proper remedy for misjoinder was separate trials.
Dismissal of one of the actions only increases delay and adds to the
cost.
52. See Mid-South Car & Truck Rental v. Moore, 516 So. 2d 1224 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1987), which held cumulation proper in actions arising out of separate accidents. See
also Hess v. Sports Publication Co., 520 So. 2d 472 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988) and Probst
v. Wroten, 433 So. 2d 734 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983), which allowed the actions to be
consolidated.
53. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20.
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